Tag: Nestlé

Today, in an 8-1 ruling, the Supreme Court issued a decision in favor of two corporations accused of links to child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The case, Nestlé v. Doe, was a lawsuit brought by six Mali citizens against the companies Nestlé USA and Cargill. The lawsuit claimed that the chocolate makers aided and abetted child slavery on African cocoa farms, reversing a ruling that allowed the claims to proceed under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas said the companies’ activities in the United States were not sufficiently related to the alleged abuses to be subject to suit under the ATS. The decision, the latest in a series of rulings, sets increasingly strict limitations on federal lawsuits based on foreign human rights abuses. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the lone dissent.

I wrote about the December 2020 oral arguments here. The decision feels like a setback, especially as we observed World Day Against Child Labor just last week (June 12th), and, yesterday, the U.S. State Department heralded the 10th anniversary of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs):

These principles recognize a three-pronged approach to protecting human rights in the context of business activity: States have the duty to protect human rights; businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights; and victims affected by business-related human rights issues should have access to remedy. We commemorate the achievements made over the last decade in these areas, and take heed of the substantive work that still needs to be done toward realization of these principles.

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, Press Statement

While the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Nestlé USA and Cargill, hope is not lost. The majority of justices rejected a notion of corporate immunity under the statute. The ruling continues to hold that corporations can be sued under international law for actions within their supply chain. The case will be remanded to a lower court where the six trafficked children will seek to amend their case in such a way as to satisfy today’s ruling. I join in the hopes that they have their day in court and that justice is done.

Taking “heed of the substantive work that still needs to be done,” SGI urges Nestlé and Cargill to take action to action to eliminate the grave crime of child slavery from their supply chain, and we will continue to call upon all companies with whom we engage to see and act on their responsibility for protecting and respecting human rights and providing remediation for those instances were human rights have been violated.

Today (December 2nd) is International Day for the Abolition of Slavery.

Yesterday, in a cruel irony, the U.S. Supreme Court heard consolidated oral arguments in Nestlé USA, Inc v. Doe I, Docket number 19-416 and Cargill, Inc v. Doe I, a consolidated case on U.S. corporations and liabilities for alleged child slave labor violations abroad.

The basic facts of what happened are beyond dispute: six Africans were trafficked out of Mali as children, where they were forced to work long hours on Ivory Coast cocoa farms and locked at night into shacks. Attorneys for the six Africans argued that the companies should have better monitored their cocoa suppliers in West Africa and have liability. The countries of the region grow about two-thirds of the world’s cocoa, and child labor is endemic.

Looking at the docket files for the case, one finds amicus briefs from Coca-Cola, Chevron, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and a joint filing for three trade associations (National Confectioners Association, the World Cocoa Foundation, and the European Cocoa Association), all in support of Cargill. As well, the Washington Legal Foundation and the Cato Institute filed amicus briefs in support of the corporations.

Cargill and Nestle selected a lawyer well-known to MSNBC aficionados to represent them: Neal Katyal, a former Acting Solicitor General of the United States, and the creator of an inspiring TED Talk.  Both companies have strongly worded policies against child labor and human trafficking and the like. All of the amicus briefs stated that they abhor child slavery and the corporations actively take steps to eradicate such practices among their suppliers.

The broad outline of the companies’ argument is found in the second page of Katyal and his team’s brief:

Plaintiffs’ brief confirms that all they have alleged (and can allege) is that Nestlé USA lawfully purchased some cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire and exercised some generalized supervision. The true wrongdoers are the Malian and Ivorian traffickers, farmers, and overseers who injured Plaintiffs in West Africa.

In other words, the practices of Nestlé, Cargill and, by extension, Chevron, Coca-Cola, and all multi-national corporations with dispersed supply chains are sufficient. The terms of their contracts are clear and exclude child labor, human trafficking, and all forms of modern slavery. Occasionally, they do audits of their suppliers. Isn’t that enough? How can a company be responsible for all the actions of their suppliers?

At issue, according to the briefs, is liability under the Alien Tort Statute, a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.  It has been enshrined in U.S. law for more than 230 years. To me, the most interesting exchange during the hearing was between Justice Elena Kagan and Katyal (pages 19-21 of the transcript):

JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Katyal, is child slavery, not aiding and abetting it but the offense itself, is that a violation of a specific universal and obligatory norm?

KATYAL: We’re — we’re not – yes, I think we’re not challenging that here. It’s just the aiding and abetting.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. So, if that’s right, could a former child slave bring a suit against an individual slaveholder under the ATS?

KATYAL: So they — if it were – if it weren’t extraterritorial and it wasn’t a corporate action, yes.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah, no problem extraterritorial, no problem aiding and abetting, just a straight suit.

KATYAL: Correct.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. And could the same child — former child slave in the same circumstances bring a suit against 10 slaveholders?

KATYAL: You know, if they – if they met the — you know, the requirements under the — the law, yeah, sure. I mean, if they —

JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. So if —

KATYAL: — if it was a plausible allegation.

JUSTICE KAGAN: — if you could bring a suit against 10 slaveholders when those 10 slaveholders form a corporation, why can’t you bring a suit against the corporation?

KATYAL: Because the corporation requires an individual form of liability under a norm, a specific norm, of — of – under international law, which doesn’t exist here. I think Sosa in Footnote —

JUSTICE KAGAN: I — I — I guess what I’m asking is, like, what sense does this make? This goes back to Justice Breyer’s question. What sense does this make? You have a suit against 10 slaveholders, 10 slaveholders decide to form a corporation specifically to remove liability from themselves, and now you’re saying you can’t sue the corporation?

Justice Kagan was pointing toward an amicus brief from the Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges filed in support of the six Africans. In the brief, Oona Hathaway sets forth a compelling argument that:

Slavery, forced labor, and human trafficking constitute the worst forms of human exploitation. The law of nations has long prohibited these practices in specific, universal, and obligatory terms. Indeed, these prohibitions are among the most longstanding, deeply rooted prohibitions in international human rights law. Each of these prohibitory norms of international law extends, moreover, to natural and juridical [corporations] persons alike. (p. 33)

Citizens United v FEC decided that corporations are people, when it comes to political spending, but corporations are now arguing that they are not people when it comes to child labor, human trafficking, and modern slavery.

I won’t pretend to know how this court will decide the case, but it should go without saying that aiding and abetting slavery is wrong, whether it is done by an individual or a corporation.